Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice instructs the Court to apply, as a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law, "the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists," namely, scholarly writings. Based upon a survey of more than 600 Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, this paper describes the International Court of Justice's use of these sources and analyzes the individual scholars and writings which have been most useful to the Court. It also explores the meaning of a 'subsidiary source' and the contexts in which judges are most willing to utilize such sources.
Introduction
When deciding disputes between States, in addition to the three principal sources of international law, the International Court of Justice ('ICJ') is to draw upon "the teachings of the most highly-qualified publicists of the various 1 In Section 2, the paper analyzes the language of the Statute and its negotiating history for guidance as to the meaning of both concepts. In Section 3, I describe some of the 'conventional wisdom' derived from prior scholarly analysis of the Court's use of highly-qualified publicists. In Section 4, I set out the methodology of my survey of the Court's writings, including a discussion of how I determined when the Court is "apply[ing] … the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists". In Section 5, I summarize the findings of my survey. I conclude by setting out plans for further study.
The language of the Statute
According to Article 38(1) of its Statute, in rendering its judgments, the International Court of Justice relies upon three principal sources of law: 2 (a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
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Michael Peil (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; [and] (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 3 In addition, Article 38(1)(d) provides in very particular language for reliance upon a fourth source of law:
subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly-qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 4 Given the lack of clarity in these terms, reference to the travaux préparatoires of Article 38, as well as subsequent interpretation by experts in the procedure and practice of the Court, is in order.
The travaux préparatoires of Article 38(1)
The sources of law enumerated in Article 38(1) are drawn materially verbatim from the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice ('PCIJ'). It is therefore appropriate to review briefly the discussions of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, the multi-national committee of experts tasked by the League of Nations to draft the PCIJ Statute. Doctrine was not included in the original draft of the rules of law to be applied by Court. The President of the Committee, Baron Descamps, 5 prepared a draft which enumerated only conventions, custom, the "legal conscience of civilised nations", and international jurisprudence. In his remarks the following day, however, Descamps indicated a desire to add "objective justice" to the sources of law, reasoning that "it is absolutely impossible and supremely odious to say to the judge that, although in a given case a perfectly just solution is possible: 'You must take a course amounting to a refusal of justice' merely because no definite convention or custom appeared." 6 He suggested that, in determining the rules of objective justice, the Court be permitted to use, inter alia, "the concurrent teaching of the authors whose opinions have authority". 4 Ibid., Art. 38(1)(d). 5 Procés-Verbaux of the Advisory Committee of Jurists (1920) , at 306. 6 Ibid., at 323. 7 Ibid. Descamps invoked Chancellor Kent: "when the greater part of jurisconsults agree upon a certain rule-the presumption in favor of that rule becomes so strong, that only a person who makes a mock of justice would gainsay it." Ibid.
It was clear at this time that Baron Descamps intended for doctrine to be a 'tie-breaker' , to avoid a non liquet in the event that principal rules of law were non-existent or inconclusive. He explained:
If neither [treaty] law nor custom existed, could the judge pronounce a non liquet? The President was convinced that he could not; the judge must then apply general principles of law. But he must be saved from the temptation of applying these principles as he pleased. For that reason he urged that the judge render decisions in keeping with the dictates of the legal conscience of civilised peoples and for this same purpose make use of the doctrines of publicists carrying authority. 8 Mr. Root and Lord Phillimore responded by submitting an alternative draft, which introduced the four-element structure reflected in present-day Article 38(1), albeit with an explicit hierarchy of sources. The Root-Phillimore proposal ranked doctrine fourth in this hierarchy, and described it as "the opinions of writers as a means for the application and development of law". 9 Baron Descamps responded to the Root-Phillimore draft by emphasizing that "the judge must use the … coinciding doctrines of jurists, as auxiliary and supplementary means, only". 10 Mr. Ricci-Busatti expressed skepticism that "it would be possible to find coinciding doctrine concerning points in relation to which no generally recognised rules existed". 11 More fundamentally, he "denied most emphatically that the opinions of authors could be considered as a source of law to be applied by the Court". 12 Lord Phillimore, the author of the draft, replied that doctrine was "universally recognised as a source of international law", but that "only the opinions of widely recognised authors" would be considered. 13 Mr. Ricci-Busatti "doubted whether States would really accept rules which would be the result of the doctrine rather than of their own will, or of their usages", 14 and asked in fine whether Lord Phillimore's own government would accept a judgment based solely upon the doctrine of legal writers; Lord 140
Michael Peil
Phillimore "thought that this was possible". 15 Mr. Ricci-Busatti had in fact submitted a competing draft, which removed doctrine as a source of law, but instructed the Court to "take into consideration … the opinions of the best qualified writers of the various countries, as means for the application and development of law". 16 Mr. de Lapradelle opposed including doctrine in the draft, but insisted that if it were included, it be "limited to coinciding doctrines of qualified authors in the countries concerned in the case". 17 He also proposed that the sources of doctrine be "arranged according to their importance" with, for example, the Institut de droit international at the top of the list. 18 None of his proposals were taken up by the Committee.
In the end, the issue was not resolved-with Baron Descamps and Mr. Ricci-Busatti repeatedly emphasizing "the auxiliary character of [doctrine] as elements of interpretation", 19 and later emphasizing "doctrine and jurisprudence no doubt do not create law; but they assist in determining rules which exist", 20 and Lord Phillimore insisting that "custom is formed by the usage followed in various public and formal documents, and from the works of writers who agree upon a certain point".
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The Committee agreed upon compromise language for the second reading, "the doctrines of the best qualified writers of the various nations as a means for the application and development of law". 22 The drafting committee modified this to "rules of law derived from … the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations". 23 In the second reading, Baron Descamps proposed adding "as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law", and this amendment was adopted along with the Article as a whole without recorded discussion.
24
In conclusion, the Committee settled on intentionally ambiguous language ("as subsidiary means" and "the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists") without resolving the underlying disagreements between Root and Phillimore, on the one hand, and Descamps and Ricci-Busatti, on the other.
Scholarly Writings as a Source of Law
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Subsequent treatment by scholars
Writing in his private capacity while serving as a judge at the PCIJ, Manley O. Hudson described the ambiguity surrounding "subsidiary means" aptly:
What is meant by subsidiary is not clear. It may be thought to mean that these sources are to be subordinated to others mentioned in the article, i.e. to be regarded only when sufficient guidance cannot be found in international conventions, international custom and general principles of law; the French term auxiliaire seems, however, to indicate that confirmation of rules found to exist may be sought by referring to jurisprudence and doctrine. 25 Hudson concluded, however, "[j]udicial decisions and the teachings of publicists are not rules to be applied, but sources to be resorted to for finding applicable rules." Shabtai Rosenne reasoned from a voluntarist notion of public international law, observing that "[d]octrine is not positive international law as previously described, nor does it stand on the same basis as international judicial decisions since it is not the product of direct or indirect action of States. For that reason alone, the role of doctrine is truly 'subsidiary.'" 28 He concluded that doctrine was "an entirely different aspect, namely means for the determination of rules of law, that is rules falling into any one of heads (a), (b) and (c)". He described 142
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Article 38(1)(d) sources as merely "the storehouse from which the rules … can be extracted". 29 This followed the earlier conclusion of Schwarzenberger-who described subhead (d) as simply enumerating "some of the means for the determination of alleged rules of international law" 30 -and Waldock-who observed in 1962 that it was "universally agreed" that jurisprudence and doctrine were merely "evidentiary sources which may assist in satisfying the Court as to the existence of a conventional or customary rule or of a general principle of law".
31
While the scholars are in universal agreement as to the meaning of "subsidiary", they offer little guidance as to the meaning of "most highly qualified". In addition to the quote from Schwarzenberger in the introduction, Rosenne observes, " [t] here is, of course, no way of establishing who is a 'most highly qualified publicist' of any nation. This is a matter for the skill, knowledge and appreciation of the individual legal advisor." 
Prior scholarly analysis of the Court's use of doctrine
Having established its proper place in the sources hierarchy, scholarly discussion concerning doctrine has focused on two issues: the kinds of writings that constitute "teachings" and the paucity of doctrine cited by the Court in its Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders. In my review of the practice of the judges-principally in individual and joint opinions-I seek to examine the conventional wisdom concerning doctrine laid out in this section.
What constitutes a "teaching"?
The question of who is a "publicist" is closely related to that of what constitutes a "teaching". The distinction is important, as the Court's "function is to decide in accordance with international law", 37 that is, consistent with lex lata. The distinction has not always been respected: Lauterpacht noted "the prolific and occasionally indiscriminate citation of authors in the written and oral pleadings of the parties" 38 ; while Schwarzenberger castigated the scholars themselves, noting, "[n]othing has brought the doctrine of international law into greater disrepute than proneness of individual representatives to present desiderata de lege ferenda in the guise of propositions de lege lata."
39
In light of this concern, Schwarzenberger demanded scholars "try [their] hardest not to blur the border lines between lex lata and lex ferenda". 40 One purpose of this study is to determine whether publicists have succeeded and whether ICJ decisions reflect a corresponding care for those border lines.
Why has the Court not cited doctrine?
The Court has cited publicists in only 22 of its 139 Judgments and Advisory Opinions. 41 Writing in 1958, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht noted that this practice was at odds with the plain language of the Court's Statute:
Article 38 is explicit on that subject; it is mandatory in its reference to the "teachings of publicists" as a subsidiary source of the law 34 This is nothing new. Brownlie notes that "Gidel has had some formative influence on the law of the sea." I. 40 Ibid., at 259. 41 For my methodology in determining these numbers, see infra Section 4. to be applied by the Court. A study of the deliberations of the Committee of Jurists who drafted the Statute of the Court does not bear out any suggestion that the authority thus conferred upon the Court ought to remain nominal. 42 The contrast between the Statutory mandate and practice was-and remainsstriking. At the time of Lauterpacht's observation, the Court had delivered 28 Judgments and Advisory Opinions, and had cited publicists on only two occasions: in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case 43 and in Nottebohm.
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Writers have commonly posited five causes for the reticence of the Court to refer explicitly to doctrine.
The first theory derives from the voluntarist perspective. In this spirit, Waldock noted sympathetically, "the Court prefers, if possible, to base itself on evidence more obviously emanating from States or from tribunals invested by States with law-determining authority." 45 This reason is unsatisfying, as it reduces the act of citation to a mere formality. After all, the parties' oral and written pleadings are publicly available, and "perusal of the pleadings … will quickly show the authorities brought to the attention of the court or tribunal and enable the discerning reader to see for himself what teachings of what publicists were adopted by the Court". 46 The second cause presented suggests that jurisprudence is displacing doctrine as the preferred subsidiary source. Namely, "with the growth of international judicial activity … it is natural that reliance on the authority of writers as evidence of international law should tend to diminish". 47 This suggestion fails for two reasons. First, while it may be (in the authors' minds) 'natural' to privilege jurisprudence over doctrine, such a preference is nowhere authorized or implied in the Statute, which makes no distinction between the two in subhead (d). Second and more importantly, it presupposes that at some 42 early point in the Court's history, it did in fact rely upon doctrine; as noted above, this is simply not the case. The third cause may be termed 'technological' . If the role of the publicist is simply to summarise State practice or evidences of general principles, that function is progressively supplanted as publishers (first print, then electronic) make access to primary sources more readily available. Writing well before the advent of the Internet, Lauterpacht observed, " [t] here is no doubt that the availability of official records of the practice of states and of collections of treaties has substantially reduced the necessity for recourse to writings of publicists as evidence of custom."
48 This justification ignores, however, the true value of the learned publicist, namely, "to make a synthesis from the decisions, sometimes to detect a thread of principle running through them, and often to indicate the true line of development and the danger of getting onto the wrong track".
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The fourth concerns the process of the Court's deliberations. As demonstrated by the wide divergence of opinion in Separate Opinions, individual judges frequently agree as to the result but disagree fundamentally as to the legal basis for that result. For this reason, "the practice of including citations of individual publicists does not sit well with the concept of a collective pronouncement of what the law is". 50 Taken at face value, however, this rationale suggests that any disagreement among the majority judges as to the source of a rule-for example, in the situation where an obligation might derive from conventional or customary law, or from one of two conventions-results in the source being excised from the decision. This ignores the role that Separate Opinions play in the development of the law. As Rosenne observed, It has for some time been commonly felt among competent observers of the Court that individual opinions which, so to speak, underpin the anonymous decisions of the Court, thanks to their greater freedom of expression and emphasis on underlying principles which the anonymous author of the majority view cannot always articulate fully, or which, in another direction, by indicating other legal principles which can govern the particular circumstances, may correct any misleading impression which the majority opinion might convey, or which, by flatly contradicting it, are seen by enlightened legal opinion to be expressive of better law, have a value of their own not so much for the development of the law as for the proper functioning of the Court. 51 Finally, authors have noted that the reticence may simply be a matter of etiquette. Rosenne delicately refers to the "the inherent and embarrassing difficulty of saying who is a 'most highly qualified publicist"' 52 and, by negative implication, who-among the countless others writing on the same topic-is less qualified. Pellet notes, less tactfully, "[i]nternational law is a 'small world' not exempt from jealousy and envy and the Court is certainly well-advised not to distribute good or bad marks." 53 However, the frequency with which individual and joint opinions name individual authors suggests that judges do not feel particularly embarrassed, though the point is taken that those judges, collectively, might wish to avoid giving the imprimatur of the Court to an individual scholar, paving the way for the creation of a new Digest. Rosenne convincingly justifies the "special place" reserved for the ILC, noting that "it is not composed of the representatives of States but of experts sitting in their individual capacity" and that it was "created by States in the General Assembly to enable the General Assembly to carry out its obligation under Article 13(1)(a) of the Charter, that is for the very purpose of the progressive development and codification of international law". 57 This mandate in particular distinguishes the ILC from other, freelance publicists.
Methodology of this survey
The process of culling bona fide teachings from over 14,000 pages of opinions required several stages of review. The following process is not intended to be scientific, but was rather intended as a first pass, to enable me to make preliminary observations and prepare a methodology for a later, more empirically rigorous study. For each putative teaching, I created an 'entry' which included the PDF file number, the case, the authoring judge(s), the page number on which the citation occurred, the identity of the source, and the cited material in the context of the opinion. This process led to approximately 1,400 pages of material.
Documentary scope
Culling the entries
In the second stage, I worked through the entries and began removing those which did not constitute a legal 'teaching' . An example of a characteristic application of a publicist's teaching can be found in Judge Dillard ' I exclude references to prior Judgments of the Court. This is for two reasons. First, these judgments could textually be placed in the other category of Article 38(1)(d), namely, "judicial decisions". Second, much has already been written on the use of judicial precedents by the ICJ, 63 and it is not the purpose of this paper to contribute to that discussion.
More controversially, I exclude references to prior individual opinions of the Court itself. Although these sources are rightly considered the teachings of publicists, 64 the number of citations is enormous compared to those to other publicists, and this matter is properly the subject of a separate study.
I excluded references to counsel's oral or written arguments, on the grounds that these references were intended to illustrate a party's position, not to establish authority.
I excluded entries in which scholars merely report a single case or arbitral decision, for example, those included at pp. 44-6 of Judge Alfaro's Separate Opinion at the Merits stage of the Temple of Preah Vihear case. 65 in the Court's numerous demarcation opinions, in which establishing historical fact is of the essence.
I excluded references to the travaux préparatoires of conventions negotiated by representatives of States. The travaux are, of course, useful to the judges for the purpose of establishing the negotiating history of a treaty in force between the States parties. 67 However, even when the speaker is a well-regarded legal scholar, such statements are the political and negotiating position of a State, not an authoritative statement of what the law is.
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I excluded references to extra-legal authorities for purposes of, for example, principles of logic.
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I excluded references in the form of appeals to policy, even where the citation is to an otherwise law-related source.
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I exclude citations to dictionaries-even legal dictionaries-that merely recite a definition. 71 In contrast, citations to self-described 'dictionaries' -for 67 Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties permits recourse to "supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion" in order to confirm the prima facie interpretation of the meaning of a treaty provision, or where such prima facie interpretation "leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. By the end of this process, I reduced the number of entries to 3,857 and these are the basis for my observations, infra. This remaining dataset is likely still over-inclusive, as many of the facially law-oriented references may not have been intended by the judge to demonstrate a rule of law.
Observations
As a result of the survey, I was able to make several preliminary observations. The following observations are largely quantitative, and are intended as a reference for further study. Likewise, judges cite publicists in support of a purported maxim of law.
The
78 Both practices are consistent with the consensus understanding of doctrine as an evidentiary source.
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Explaining the practice of the Court itself. One of the most common uses of publicists is to describe the procedure of the ICJ. Shabtai Rosenne is the second most cited publicist (behind only the ILC), with 140 references in 75 different opinions, spanning 47 different phases or cases. Rosenne's research into such procedural matters as third-party intervention, the nature of a justiciable dispute, and provisional measures, has been cited in individual opinions for three decades.
Likewise, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, most commonly cited for issues concerning admissibility, the jurisdiction of the Court, and the scope and nature of party consent, ranks fifth among publicists, with 61 references in 46 different opinions. Fitzmaurice is frequently cited to describe the procedures and procedural limitations of the Court.
The invocation of doctrine in this realm is not surprising, as external primary sources, apart from its own broadly-worded Statute and Rules of Court, are not to be expected. However, this is one realm in which jurisprudence is capable of displacing doctrine; namely, once a Judgment is delivered concerning 77 79 See Procés-Verbaux, supra note 5, at 335 ("Lord Phillimore explained that by 'general principles' he had intended to mean 'maxims of law'"). Schwarzenberger criticized over-reliance on maxims as one of the failings of the deductive method of legal inquiry. See Schwarzenberger, supra note 39, at 242-3 ("As has been so frequently the fate of natural law, so maxims, meant originally to be helpful devices for purposes of teaching and memorising, may be degraded into legal disguises of intrinsically political postulates. It is against this type of unholy mixture of law and politics that the doctrine of international law requires to be immunised").
of doctrine de lege ferenda in support of an opinion which argues for progressive development is consistent with Shahabuddeen's view that one function of an individual opinion is to "clarify or restate the law in a way which proves to be helpful to its development". 92 Such a view, however, must be tempered by Judge Spender's declaration in South West Africa, in which he set out four conclusions concerning the proper scope of individual opinions, and concluded that "there must exist a close link between individual opinions and the judgment of the Court". 93 
Generalists outpace specialists
One clear observation from the data is that publicists who write across a broad range of topics-and, for that matter, abridgments-are cited much more often than specialists. Even setting aside his work as editor of Oppenheim's International Law, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht places third among publicists, with 98 references in 61 different opinions. He is cited for such varied topics as principles of treaty interpretation 94 and immunities. 95 Oppenheim's itself places sixth among sources, with 54 mentions in 40 opinions.
By contrast, the highest-ranking 'specialists' are Joe Verhoeven (nearly exclusively cited for criminal procedure matters, including head-of-state immunity and genocide) with 24 references in just six opinions, and William A. Schabas, 19 of whose 20 citations occur in opinions in the Bosnian Genocide case. This is not particularly surprising: neither the Court nor the publicists themselves control the docket of the Court. The Court simply has more opportunities to cite publicists who have written in a number of different areas; by contrast, a genocide scholar is likely only to be cited in cases concerning genocide.
It is possible to identify the "most-favored publicists"
Based upon a raw compilation of the number of citations, it is possible to make some preliminary observations about the most commonly cited publicists in the opinions of the Court. It is important, however, to also take into account the number of different opinions which cite a given publicist. 96 Because of the imprecision of my methodology thus far, I will refrain from attaching specific numbers to any author (other than those mentioned elsewhere), but the following tiers appear to describe the preferences of the Court:
Ubiquitous publicists. The following publicists are cited more than 80 times in more than 40 opinions.
